


# Formen des Unmoralischen

8. Sitzung, 24.6.2019  
Moralismus





Cesare Lombroso



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# L'UOMO DELINQUENTE

IN RAPPORTO

**ALL'ANTROPOLOGIA, GIURISPRUDENZA**

**E ALLE DISCIPLINE CARCERARIE**

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
„Die erste Gruppe ist die der Mörder, Wegelagerer und Räuber. Der grösste Theil ihrer Handschriften ist durch langes Ausziehen der Buchstaben kenntlich, weshalb die Herren vom Fach diese Schriftart die schwertförmige nennen, d. i. die mehr runde und zugleich aus der Verlängerung der Buchstaben nach oben oder unten vorspringende Form. Bei Vielen ist der Querstrich am t kräftiger oder länger, eine Eigenheit der Kriegsleute und energischer Menschen; bei einigen Anderen bilden / die Grundstriche mit den Haarstrichen der Buchstaben spitze Winkel. Bei Allen ist der Namenszug mit einer Menge von Strichen und Arabesken versehen, dass man ihn dadurch von jedem anderen unterscheiden kann.“ 402 f.)

„Die Handschriften von Schwindlern, Fälschern und Stupratoren standen mir nicht reichlich genug zu Gebote, um einen sicheren Schluss daraus ziehen zu können; dennoch aber scheint es mir, als ob das schwertähnliche Aussehen ihrer Buchstaben, die dolchförmigen Schlussbuchstaben, der übertriebene Schnörkel des Namenszuges viele Aehnlichkeit mit der Schreibweise der Wegelagerer hätten.“ (404)





„Das Verbrechen tritt demnach wie eine Naturerscheinung — die Philosophen würden sagen, wie eine nothwendige Erscheinung — auf, gleich denen der Geburt, des Todes, der Geisteskrankheit, von welcher es oft eine traurige Abart bildet.“ (537)





## Leitfragen

- Welche Formen von Moralismus lassen sich unterscheiden?
- Wer oder was kann alles moralistisch sein?
- Was ist die Ursache von Moralismus?
- Wie hängen Moralismus und andere Formen des Unmoralischen wie Terrorismus miteinander zusammen?
- Warum ist Moralismus moralisch problematisch?
- Inwiefern wird dem Opfer von Moralismus Leid zugefügt?



Hermann Lübbe  
**Politischer Moralismus**  
Der Triumph  
der Gesinnung über  
die Urteilskraft

*CORSO* bei Siedler



“In this paper I will explore ‘moralism’ as the illicit introduction of moral considerations [3]. In this sense, ‘moralism,’ like other terms of disapproval such as ‘sexism,’ is essentially normative, and attributes some kind of mistake or error. Usually, but not always, the moralizer is condemned for making a mistake in judgment and behaviour. Sometimes the mistake is one of emphasis or excess. Moralizers can be excessive about morality in some way, and thus seem to exhibit a vice, one involving lack of due proportion in the direction of extreme demandingness or strictness. But a moralizer is also didactic, and this is the behavioural aspect.” (137)



“Sometimes, for example, the excess has to do with how the person reacts to perceived immorality. An excessively harsh reaction, then, can also be characterized as moralism. The excessive concern about perceived moral issues blocks due concern for other issues, so the moralizer can often come off as one-dimensional or priggish. To the moralizer what matters is **morality**, and those who find his behaviour irritating are those who are failing to do what they ought to do, or to believe what they ought to believe. Thus, the moralizer considers himself completely justified. And, it is hard to see what *is* wrong with moralizing behaviour, given that moral reasons are held to be overriding — the moralizer is just pointing out our true obligations, right?”



“I have argued elsewhere that moralizing which involves actively trying to impose values on others can be counterproductive [4]. However, in this essay I’d like to explore the more general issues raised by moralism as an illicit use of moral considerations. An additional issue to be explored is one reaction to at least one sort of moralism discussed here. That reaction is a casuistical method for making moral judgments.” (137)



“One variety of moralism I would like to look at is that associated with being excessively demanding. There are at least two ways in which one might be excessively demanding or excessively strict: (1) by holding the supererogatory to be obligatory, or otherwise not being sensitive to non-moral costs — a form of moral perfectionism, and / (2) by insisting on strict adherence to absolute moral rules. These are distinct because, though they both involve issues taken (by someone) to be genuinely moral, in the first category the moralizer fails to recognize the moral optionality of some actions and in the second category the moralizer seems insensitive to nuances that might move one away from strict adherence to rules [5].” (137 f.)

“The moralizer is also one who seeks to convert others, or apply pressure — and this is what is especially problematic. For example, in the case of (1) we might actually hold someone to be particularly admirable if they adopted as personal obligations what most consider supererogatory. Saintry people are sometimes viewed this way — as putting enormous demands on themselves. This is not moralism in and of itself. However, if they attempt to get others to risk their lives for the sake of someone else, and if they portray those who don’t as lacking even minimal decency, then this looks like moralism. Thus, simply having high standards does not make one moralistic — Mother Teresa had high standards, but this did not make her moralistic.” (138)



“However, if she had insisted that everyone must make the sacrifices she made in order to be minimally decent the case would have been otherwise. Thus, there seems to be a public aspect to moralizing. Sermonizing seems to be the same. While one can internally be moralistic, one cannot purely be an internal moralizer. Internal admonishment is not moralizing since it does not involve imposing on someone else. The imposition of excessive values or the excessive imposition of values captures what is wrong with moralizing.” (138)

“When someone is moralizing one is putting undue moral pressure on another. Thus, moralizing points to a self/other asymmetry in moralism. A moralist can simply be putting pressure on himself, but a moralizer does so with respect to others. There are situations in which people moralize about others amongst each other — for example, you could imagine two people watching the New York City news on T.V. and clucking over the outrageous and immoral behaviour prevalent in the big city — the condemnation is not directed at someone else — no one else witnesses it, even. However, it is still about others and publicly expressed.” (138)



“There is a third category of moralism that may or may not be demanding of others. This consists in (3) taking non-moral factors to be moral ones. That is, making illicit use of distinctly moral considerations both in prescription and explanation [6]. This category is somewhat different in that there doesn’t seem to be the same requirement of publicity as in the first two senses, since it isn’t associated necessarily with blame or castigating behaviour. One can make such misattributions with respect to oneself (indeed, social psychologists tend to think of this as fairly common) and it can be private [7].” (138)



“However, to the extent that these sorts of misattributions are public and made against the behaviour of others this tendency is a vice. It seems similar to (1) since a person exhibiting this vice is putting moral emphasis where it does not belong. However, it is different because (1) involves taking a genuinely moral consideration and inflating it. So (3) exhibits a different vice — that of treating moral reasons as more pervasive than they actually are.” (138)

“(1) Andy is waiting on a street corner for the signal to cross. Ralph, who is standing next to him angrily denounces him for not helping Rose, who is standing next to them both, with her groceries. While Andy agrees that it is nice to help people carry their groceries, he doesn’t think he has an obligation to do so, and is upset by the criticism.” (139)

“(2) Aurelia gives roughly 10% of her income to charity each year, but her sister Constance accuses her of moral laxity, not living up to minimal moral standards, which would require much greater levels of charitable giving — at least 50%. Aurelia disagrees, believing that she is already at the level of supererogatory giving, and deeply resents her sister’s criticism.” (139)



**Vielen Dank für die Aufmerksamkeit**